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The stability of the labour share of income is a fundamental feature of macroeconomic models, with 
broad implications for the shape of the production function, inequality, and macroeconomic 
dynamics. However, empirically, this share has been slowly declining in many countries for several 
decades, though its causes are subject of much debate. This paper analyses the drivers of labour share 
developments in Europe at a sectoral level. We begin with a simple shift-share analysis which 
demonstrates that the decline across countries has been primarily driven by changes within industries. 
We then use aggregated microdata from CompNet to analyse drivers of sector-level labour shares and 
to decompose their effects into shifts in the sector average or reallocation of resources between firms. 
Our main findings are that the advance of globalisation and the widening productivity gap between 
“the best and the rest” have negative implications for the labour share. We also find that most of the 
changes are due to reallocation within sectors providing support for the “superstar firms” hypothesis. 
The finding that globalisation has had a negative impact on the labour share is of relevance for policy 
in the context of the current backlash against globalisation and reinforces the need to ensure benefits 





1. Introduction  
The labour share represents the proportion of national income that is received by workers as 
compensation, in the form of wages, salaries and the social contributions paid by employers. The 
stability of this has been a fundamental feature of macroeconomic models for many decades, holding 
broad implications for the shape of the production function, inequality, and macroeconomic 
dynamics.  
Changes in the labour share over time matter because wages are the main form of income for the 
majority of households, and therefore capture how well the benefits from the economy’s performance 
are being translated into commensurate improvements in household income. A labour share decline 
concurrent with economic growth implies that gains made from productivity or globalisation are not 
being passed on to workers. For policy, a declining trend raises concerns as a fall in the labour share 
can have a distributional impact. A decrease in the labour share implies a corresponding rise in the 
capital share of income and since most capital tends to be concentrated amongst a small share of 
individuals at the top of the income scale, this can contribute to growing inequality. Income and wealth 
inequality has worsened in advanced countries in recent decades (Wolff, 2010) in line with the 
declining labour share trend. For these reasons, a declining labour share can also have political 
consequences if it erodes support for market-oriented economic policies and globalisation. 
Until the 1980s, the labour share being relatively fixed over time was accepted as a ‘stylized fact’ in 
economic literature (Kaldor, 1961). This was true to the point where most macroeconomic growth 
models of the time, the most famous being the Solow model (1956), assumed it to hold a constant 
value. However, since then evidence of a decline in the labour share was found to have occurred from 
the 1970s until the 2000s (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Dao et al., 2017). This has provoked 
extensive research efforts to provide possible explanations and adequate policy response, with trends 
such as technological advances and greater global value chain participation being the most prominent 
arguments linked the compression of labour shares (Schwellnus et al., 2018). 
The decline has been broad based across regions and economies.1 Although the pace of this decline 
has slowed in most countries since 1995, it has still manifested itself in a decoupling between 
productivity growth and compensation of workers (Schwellnus et al. 2018). In addition to this secular 
decline, the labour share also possesses a cyclical pattern, occurring due to investment in capital 
tending to be more volatile in a recession, in contrast to wages which are relatively sticky. This led to 
the temporary jump in the labour share in the late 2000s, coinciding with the Great Recession, which 
interrupted the longer-term pattern.  
Most of the initial literature tended to focus on the macro- or sectoral determinants of this labour 
share, with the two leading explanations for the downward trend being the rapid advice of technology 
and the globalisation of trade. Technological advancement can affect labour shares through a 
                                                             
1 It occurred in seven of the eight largest economies of the world, in emerging markets such as China, India and 
Mexico that have opened up to international trade, and even in Scandinavian countries where levels of labour 
unionisation has traditionally been strong (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). 
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reduction in the relative price of investment goods, giving firms incentives to replace labour with 
capital. Meanwhile, the rise in global integration through trade and participation in global value chains 
can affect firm structure and organisation by facilitating the offshoring of domestic production 
activities for the most labour-intensive tasks (Elsby et al., 2013). 
More recently, the literature has moved towards looking at what is driving the changes in the labour 
share at firm-level. In addition to the macro-drivers already mentioned, Autor et al. (2017) pointed to 
the rise in “superstar firms” as a factor. If changes in the economic environment advantage only the 
most productive firms in an industry product market concentration will rise and the labour share will 
fall as the share of resources held by the most productive firms (‘superstars’) in each sector, those 
with above-average mark ups and below-average labour shares, grows. In addition, the growth of this 
concentration was found to be disproportionately apparent in industries experiencing faster technical 
change. 
Mertens (2019) further contributed to the understanding of the mechanisms behind the fall of the 
labour share by analysing three of these competing explanations. The first two explanations related 
to increases in market distortions, through either firm’s product market power or labour market 
power, as have been suggested in recent literature (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018). This was tested 
against the alternative explanation that the labour share decline is due to the elasticity of output with 
respect to labour falling. Applying this to the German manufacturing sector it was found that the 
majority of the fall in the labour share is due to a concordant fall in the elasticity of labour. The labour 
share fall is also shown to be equally driven by within and between firm dynamics, in contrast to Autor 
(2017) who found it is mainly a between-firm phenomena in the US. 
Other explanations for the downward trend in the labour share are also possible, such as changes in 
institutional settings over time. The erosion of labour collective organizations (union density, 
bargaining coverage) and labour market regulation (employment protection, minimum wage 
provisions) has been highlighted in a number of papers (e.g. Bental and Demougin (2010), Blanchard 
and Giavazzi (2003), Stiglitz (2012)). Collectively, the decline of these is suggested to have weakened 
the bargaining power of workers and thus affected their outcomes in terms of rent-sharing. 
In this paper we begin by examining whether the downward trend in the labour share for each country 
is driven by within-industry declines (declines within individual industries, such as manufacturing) or 
by changes in the industrial composition (shifts from high-labour-share sectors to low-labour-share 
sectors). We do this by performing a shift-share analysis using sectoral data for 15 European countries, 
comparing the actual change in the labour share in each country to a hypothetical scenario where the 
value of each sector to the economy is held fixed over the period. We find that most of the change in 
the labour share has been largely due to within-sector changes in the labour share for most countries. 
To bridge the gap from macro to micro changes in the labour share, we then analyse the drivers of 
these labour share developments within sectors across Europe.  We use the 6th vintage of the 
CompNet database, which contains sectoral level data from 15 European countries aggregated up 
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from firm-level microdata from various administrative and public sources. This data contains a rich 
detail on variables ranging from financial to trade and competition. As it is based on firm-level data, 
the dataset contains the not only the average and median value of each variable, but also the different 
distribution points allowing for further investigation of the dynamic within sectors.2 
Our key findings are that increases in industry concentration, a widening productivity gap between 
the frontier and laggard firms and the increase in global value chain participation are all found to have 
played a significant role in the movement of the aggregate labour share over time. We further examine 
the mechanisms of these changes by decomposing the sectoral labour share into within-firm and 
between-firm components, which can provide insight into how each factor is enabling firms 
characterised by low-labour shares, potentially “superstar firms”, to grow their resources. Here, we 
find consistent evidence that it is reallocation within sectors that is the main margin by which the 
labour share is changing. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; the next section describes the data used and sources 
and section 3 presents a shift share analysis of overall sectoral labour shares. Section 4 provides an 
overview of the methodology used in the analysis of the intra-sector drivers of labour shares and the 
results of the regression analysis are then presented in section 5. Section 6 looks at how these results 
vary by sector and country, before section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
To begin, we use the EU KLEMS database, an industry level panel dataset covering OECD countries 
from 1995-2015. The KLEMS data derives from an international research collaboration that provides 
harmonized industry-level information on output, inputs and productivity taken from national 
statistical agencies and is made comparable across countries using a harmonised framework. To 
obtain the labour share for each country and sector we use the compensation of employees data and 
divide by the level of value added (in current prices), while we also analyse the compensation of 
employees data adjusted for self-employed as a robustness check. We focus on the 15 countries of 
the EU-15 and 33 2-digit industries within each of these.  
To look at the labour share at a micro-level, we make use of the 6th vintage of the CompNet database. 
CompNet data is sourced from Central Banks and National Institutes and consolidated into a common 
industry hierarchy (NACE rev. 2). We use the 6th vintage of CompNet, which covers 15 European 
countries from 1999-2016. This dataset is built up from firm-level data, aggregated up to 2-digit sector 
level. By being based on firm-level it enables the inclusion of not only the average and median value 
of each variable, but also the different distribution points and standard deviations calculated using a 
                                                             
2 By using micro-aggregated data focusing on firms and their employees, this removes the confounding 




harmonised methodology, allowing for further investigation of the dynamic within sectors.3 A full 
description of the data construction and cross-country stylised facts are contained in CompNet (2018a, 
2018b and 2018c). 
The data contains the mean wage share for each sector-year combination, while we are able to 
calculate the overall wage share using a combination of this mean and the sum of weights. The 
difference between the overall wage share and the mean gives us a covariance term capturing the 
strength of the relationship between the firm size (measured by its share of value-added in the sector) 
and its wage share. We use all three of this variables are dependent variables in our regression 
analysis. 
For our explanatory variables, we use the sectoral-level Hermann-Herfischal Index (HHI) included in 
the CompNet database as a proxy for changes in the level of competition. The standard deviation of 
productivity (both labour productivity and the Solow measure) is taken as our measure of productivity 
dispersion. As an alternative measure of this, we also measure this as the absolute gap between the 
90th percentile and 10th percentile of productivity. Finally, CompNet calculates firm and time specific 
mark-ups based on different gross output production function specifications by using the framework 
of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). We test both the measure based on a Cobb-Douglas production 
function and another assuming a translog production function. 
We complement this dataset by also including Irish firm-level data for the period 2006-2014. This is 
sourced from the Census of Industrial Production (CIP) and Annual Services Inquiry (ASI) and includes 
all the key input variables required such as wages, employment, investment, gross output and value 
added. To give an idea of the coverage of the sample provided, around 5 per cent of the entire 
population of firms as reported in the population are represented by the combined CIP and ASI sample 
each year, with these firms accounting for around 40 per cent of employment. 
Industry-level relative investment price indices are constructed from the OECD STAN database. Price 
deflators for gross fixed capital formation are divided by value added price deflators in the 
corresponding industry. The same reference year (2005) is used for all indices. Since firms in the same 
industry face similar changes in relative investment prices, the industry-level response of labour 
shares should at least partly be driven by within-firm developments rather than reallocation effects. 
GVC participation is constructed using the OECD Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) database. In line with 
previous studies, industry-level participation in global value chains is constructed as the sum of 
backward and forward linkages in vertical specialisation of production. Backward linkages measure 
the offshoring of intermediate inputs used in exports and are defined as foreign value added 
                                                             
3 The reader must be aware that data collection rules and procedures across countries are different, and out of 
CompNet’s control. Hence, despite all efforts made to improve sample comparability across countries 
(including the use of population weights), some country samples might still suffer from biases. For a more 
detailed account of raw data characteristics and sample biases, please refer to the Cross-Country 




embodied in exports. Forward linkages measure trading partners' offshoring of intermediate inputs 
and are defined as domestic value added used as intermediate inputs in trading partners’ exports. For 
the sample of high-income countries included in this paper, increases in backward and forward 
linkages are likely to have similar effects on labour shares: offshoring raises specialisation on the most 
capital-intensive stages of production while trading partners' offshoring raises demand for capital-
intensive intermediate goods, with both therefore expected to have a negative correlation with the 
labour share. 
We remove observations which display mean wage shares above 1 or below zero. Sectors coke, real 
estate or non-market are excluded from the analysis as labour shares in these industries are driven by 
changes in commodity and asset prices or by imputation choices. Finally, we drop Romania and the 
years 2015 and 2016 due to a low number of observations. The coverage across countries and time 
and summary statistics on the variables used are detailed in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1: Coverage across Countries and Time 
 Observations Years 
Belgium 447 2004-2014 
Croatia 179 2002-2014 
Czech R. 263 2003-2014 
Denmark 513 2000-2014 
Finland 503 1999-2014 
France 337 2004-2014 
Hungary 254 1999-2014 
Ireland 365 2006-2014 
Italy 426 2001-2014 
Lithuania 255 2000-2014 
Netherlands 531 2000-2014 
Portugal 251 2006-2014 
Slovenia 163 2005-2014 
Spain 135 2009-2014 
Sweden 151 2003-2014 





Table 2: Dependent and explanatory variables 
 Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Min Max 
Total labour share 4473 0.65 0.227 -5.01 1.00 
Mean/Within-industry 
labour share 4773 0.59 0.198 0.01 1.00 
Between-industry 
labour share 4773 0.06 0.261 -5.75 0.87 
Concentration (HHI) 4773 0.05 0.101 0.00 0.98 
Lab productivity Sd.Dev. 4773 0.06 0.178 0.00 9.37 
Solow residual gap 4738 0.04 0.032 0.00 0.81 
Labour productivity gap 4400 0.32 0.489 0.02 9.08 
TFP (no markup) gap 3061 0.12 0.291 0.00 6.47 
TFP (revenue) gap 3067 0.74 2.21 0.00 36.52 
TFP (value added) gap 4330 0.07 0.790 0.00 1.57 
Investment prices 4076 1.04 0.208 0.39 3.90 
Global value chain part. 3459 0.95 0.608 0.14 4.86 
Mark-up: Cobb-Douglas 3405 29.9 729.5 0.03 31391 
Mark-up: Translog 3299 22.0 196.3 0.29 6237 
 
 
3. Shift-Share Analysis 
We begin by looking at one very simple explanation for a long-run decline in the labour share which is 
that it is driven by broad structural changes in the composition of the economy, in particular by 
reallocation across sectors. Gollin (2002) put forward this argument that a possible explanation for 
the decline in the labour share is that it is the result of the changing sectoral composition of economic 
activity. Differences in shares across sectors are expected given that some activities are innately 
labour-intensive while others, such as manufacturing, are typically more capital intensive. In addition, 
competitive pressures also differ across sectors so equilibrium mark-ups can vary, which will also 
impact the long-run labour share. For these reasons, changes in the structure of the economy, 
whereby low labour share sectors begin to account for greater proportions of aggregate value-added 
than higher labour share sectors, could explain the decline in total labour share. Lawless and Whelan 
(2011) tested this theory using data up to 2007 and found that these sectoral composition effects fail 
to explain the aggregate decline in the labour share. This section updates this analysis and examines 
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how much, if any, of the change in European labour shares over twenty years is driven by broad 
reallocation across sectors.  
The shift-share analysis is performed on a sample of 15 European countries across 33 two-digit 
industries (Nace rev. 2) from the EU KLEMS database, decomposing the trend changes in labour shares 
into their within-industry and between-industry components. This means we can gauge the extent to 
which structural transformation in economies has impacted on the labour share and allows us to 
determine which we should focus on within-industry changes or the reallocation mechanisms in the 
subsequent analysis. Classical trade theory, for example, predicts a shift toward capital-intensive 
industries in capital-abundant advanced economies (resulting in lower labour shares) and a shift 
toward labour-intensive industries in labour-abundant emerging market economies (resulting in rising 
labour shares). A snapshot of the heterogeneity of labour shares across sectors in 2000 and 2015 for 
the EU-15 is shown in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Labour share differences across sectors in EU-15, 2000 vs. 2015 
 
Source: Authors calculations using EU KLEMS 
 
The shift-share analysis is carried out by creating a hypothetical scenario where industry value-added 
shares are held fixed from the first year of the sample, and therefore any changes observed in this 
hypothetical labour share over the period are due to changes within-industries. An example of the 
difference between the hypothetical scenario (blue) and the actual labour share (red) over time for 
the EU-15 is displayed in Figure 2 below. Periods when the blue line lies above the red implies that 
sectors which hold relatively high labour shares are larger in size compared to the beginning of the 
period. The results of this exercise across the different countries are then shown in Figure 3 below 
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which plots the total labour share change on the vertical axis against the within component on the 
horizontal axis. 
 
Figure 2: Labour share for EU-15, actual vs. hypothetical scenario 
 
Note: EU-15 sample begins in 2000, Ireland begins in 1998. 
Source: Authors calculations using EU KLEMS 
 
Figure 3: Labour share trends by country, within vs. actual (1995-2015) 
 
Note: EU-15 sample begins in 2000, Ireland begins in 1998. 
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The shift-share analysis suggests that the reallocation of factors across sectors has generally not been 
a significant driver of labour share trends. Most countries are clustered around the 45-degree line, 
signifying that the total changes in the labour share are the same as the hypothetical changes, which 
indicates that changes in labour shares emerge overwhelmingly from trend changes in within-industry 
labour shares rather than from the reallocation of factors across industries. An important exception is 
Ireland, with the large GDP distortions in 2015 driving down the actual labour share change.4 
These findings do not provide much support for the predictions of traditional trade theory and suggest 
that it would be useful instead to study the drivers of within-industry changes to understand overall 
trends in labour shares. Therefore, the next part of our empirical analysis turns to exploring 
aggregated micro-data at country-sector level to analyse potential drivers. 
 
4. Methodology 
To think about the potential pathways through which firm and market characteristics can impact the 
labour share, we begin with the canonical papers on productivity and market power by Hall (1988, 
1990) as applied to their analysis of labour share evolution by Autor et al (2017) and Mertens (2019). 
In this framework, standard firm cost-minimization can be combined with definitions of productivity 





𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
By definition, the labour share is the proportion of overall value-added, Y, accruing to labour (the 
product of labour input and wages, wL). This can be shown to depend on a range of parameters of the 
production function and changes in any or all of these could be drivers of the observed decline in the 
labour share, potentially with different strengths in different countries or sectors. The first important 
parameter is 𝛼𝛼 which measures the importance or substitution of labour compared to other input 
factors (capital and intermediates). This could change over time due to technological developments 
or changes in the relative prices of the inputs. Labour market power, 𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , could also impact the 
degree of rent sharing in sector and countries which may have reduced over time due to a decrease 
of union density for instance. Product market power, 𝜇𝜇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , on the other hand would be associated 
with a lower labour demand if firms are able to make greater profits but not share them with workers. 
The “superstar firms” hypothesis discussed above could operate either through reducing the 
importance of labour 𝛼𝛼 if driven by technologial developments and/or by increasing product market 
power of the dominant firms. While our data may not allow us to precisely disentangle these elements, 
it is useful to have this framework to link the different factors we examaine with the channels through 
which they would feed through to changes in the labour share.  
In addition to these factors that could impact the share of labour compensation in the value-added of 
any individual firm, reallocation across firms within a sector towards those with lower labour shares 
                                                             
4  See Appendix 1 for more detail on the Irish labour share and 2015 distortions. 
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(for any of the reasons discussed above) could also drive changes in labour shares at more aggregated 
sector levels. Autor et al. (2017) found this reallocation margin to be the main factor explaining 
changes in the labour share for US sectors and Mertens (2019) also found it to be an important, albeit 
with a smaller share, factor in his work on German manufacturing. Although our cross-country data is 
at the sector level rather than at the firm level, the high degree of distributional detail in the CompNet 
distributed microdata approach allows us to decompose the overall labour share into comparable 
within firm and between firm margins. As the overall labour share 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  for sector j at time t comes 
from an aggregation of all of the firms i in the original microdata, its components can be rearranged 












This can be further rearranged into the following expression: 




Where the first component, the average labour share in the sector 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿���𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  represents the within firm 
element and the second component, 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡(
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿���𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ), captures the between firm margin. As the 
CompNet data provides the information necessary to calculate the overall labour share as well a direct 
measure of the mean labour share within a sector we can use all three elements as dependent 
variables in our regression analysis. 
For the empirical specification, we use the following: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 + +𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 
Where 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  is the sector level labour share and can be replaced with either of its two components (the 
within and between measures). As this is estimated by OLS, the coefficients on the explanatory 
variables in the within and between estimations will sum to the coefficient on the overall labour share. 
Motivated by the superstar firm hypothesis, our choice of explanatory variables focuses on measures 
of concentration and productivity dispersion.To mesure concentration we use jtHHI the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index in industry j at time t which is computed as follows based on 2ijts  the market share 






We use a range of measures for productivity dispersion, as described in the data section. We also 
explore a range of other factors Xjt that may affect the competitive environment of a sector such as 
participation in global value chains, mark-ups and relative investment prices. We control in all 
specifications for country, sector and year fixed effects.  
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5. Analysis of sector labour shares and productivity 
In this section, we examine the relationships between the labour share of income at a sectoral level 
with a range of sector-level characteristics with a focus on measures of within-sector productivity 
dispersion. Each specification begins with the total labour share in the sector and then decomposes 
the effects into the within and between components. The coefficients on these latter two components 
sum to the overall effect giving a direct measure of their relative importance as contributors to 
variation in the total labour share. As noted above, this decomposition is useful in understanding the 
extent to which variation in labour shares are associated with developments across all firms (the 
within component) in a sector relative to how much is coming from reallocation across firms (the 
between component).  
 
Table 3: Labour Shares, Concentration and Productivity 
 Total Within Between 
Concentration (HHI) -0.282*** -0.024 -0.258*** 
 
(0.062) (0.048) (0.070) 
Lab productivity Sd.Dev. -0.091** -0.045* -0.046** 
 
(0.043) (0.027) (0.021) 
Constant 0.438*** 0.651*** -0.212*** 
 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.034) 
Observations 4,773 4,773 4,773 
R-squared 0.461 0.317 0.285 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3 gives our initial estimates of drivers of the labour share, controlling for country, sector and 
time fixed effects. We begin with a simple indicator of productivity dispersion, using the standard 
deviation of labour productivity measured at the individual sector level. In the first column, we find 
that the overall labour share is significantly lower in sectors with higher sales concentration (measured 
by the HHI) and in sectors with greater dispersion of productivity. These initial results point towards 
support of the “superstar firm” explanation of Autor et al (2017) for the decline in US labour shares 
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over time also applying across European countries. Further support for this explanation is found when 
we look at the balance of the two components. For concentration, the primary contributor to the 
overall variation in the labour share comes from reallocation across firms within sectors with the size 
of the between coefficient several times larger (and also more statistically significant) than those on 
the within component. For productivity dispersion, the effect is split more evenly between reducing 
the average labour share (within-firm component) and reallocation amongst firms to those with lower 
labour shares 
These baseline results could however be sensitive to the use of labour productivity as the explanatory 
factor so we next look at a range of different measures of productivity computed at the firm level 
under the CompNet project.  
 
Table 4: Alternative Productivity Measures  
Total Within Between Observations 
Solow residual gap -0.721*** -0.008 -0.713** 4,738 
 
(0.203) (0.181) (0.347) 
 
     
Labour productivity gap -0.121*** -0.173*** 0.051 4,772 
 
(0.030) (0.056) (0.059) 
 
     
TFP (no markup) gap 0.018* -0.050*** 0.068*** 3,061 
 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.020) 
 
     
TFP (revenue) gap 0.002 -0.003 0.004** 3,067 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
     
TFP (value added) gap -0.462*** -0.196*** -0.267*** 4,330 
 
(0.069) (0.041) (0.070) 
 
Reports separate regressions for each productivity measure. Controlling for country, 
sector and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4 summarises the results of five alternative measures of productivity within sectors: the Solow 
residual, labour productivity and three variants on the measurement of total factor productivity based 
on excluding mark-ups, a revenue approach and a value-added approach. In each case the measure of 
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dispersion is taken as the gap between the 90th and the 10th percentile.5 As in the baseline 
specification, each of the regressions reported controls for country, sector and year fixed effects. 
Although the coefficients for each productivity measure vary somewhat, the overall picture of a 
negative relationship between productivity dispersion and the labour share of income holds across 
most of the measures. Furthermore, the between component remains the key driver for most of the 
measures apart from when TFP is measured using approaches other than value added (which we 
would suggest is the more appropriate to use in this context). 
That the estimate of TFP excluding mark-ups gave a different result from our other measures of 
productivity dispersion leads us on to looking more directly at links between the overall labour share 
and mark-ups within sectors. Two different approaches to the measurement of mark-ups at the firm 
level are used (Mark-up: Cobb-Douglas and Mark-up: Translog) as described in Section 2. In both cases, 
Table 5 shows there is a statistically significant negative relationship found at the level of the overall 
labour share, the magnitude of which is driven almost entirely by the between component and with 
the within component actually showing a positive relationship in the first specification.  
 
Table Mark-Up: Labour Shares and Mark-up Dispersion 
 Total  Within  Between  
Mark-up: Cobb-Douglas -16.606*** 14.264*** -30.870*** 
 (4.673) (2.733) (3.884) 
Observations 3,405 3,405 3,405 
R-squared 0.540 0.346 0.344 
 Total Within  Between  
Mark-up: Translog -41.085* -0.279 -40.806 
 (22.890) (12.469) (29.574) 
Observations 3,299 3,299 3,299 
R-squared 0.522 0.364 0.340 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This pattern may be linked to profitable sectors being able to pay higher wages on average but that at 
the upper levels of the profitability (or productivity) distribution the sharing of returns with workers 
becomes weaker. The decomposition of the second measure does not show either margin being 
statistically significant despite the significant coefficient estimated on the overall relationship. The 
                                                             
5 Broadly similar results can be obtained by using the standard deviation as the measure of dispersion.  
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reasons for the difference across the two measures of mark-ups is unclear, and potentially related to 
how they capture the firms at the upper end of the distribution, but this is probably an area where 
more granular data would be necessary to fully disentangle the effects.  
Two other factors hypothesised to have an impact on changing labour shares at a country level are 
looked at in Table 6 using our sector dataset. The first factor is that falling prices of capital goods 
relative to labour (“Inv. price”) may have created an incentive to invest more in technologies that are 
less labour intensive. We find that there is a statistically significant relationship between this measure 
of the relative cost of capital and lower shares, again mainly driven by reallocation across firms. 
Similarly, we find that sectors with higher degrees of global value chain (GVC) integration tend to have 
lower labour shares. As we are using sector level data, we cannot directly identify to what extent this 
may be driven by multinational firms operating across countries but again this suggests a useful 
direction for future work to identify what type of firms the reallocation component is affecting most 
strongly.  
 
Table 6: Relative Investment Prices and Globalisation 
 Total  Within  Between  Total  Within  Between  
Inv. price -0.327*** -0.071*** -0.256***    
 (0.028) (0.018) (0.031)    
GVC    -0.032** 0.007 -0.039** 
    (0.015) (0.011) (0.019) 
Constant 0.749*** 0.702*** 0.047 0.620*** 0.632*** -0.011 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.048) (0.026) (0.022) (0.031) 
       
Observations 4,076 4,076 4,076 3,459 3,459 3,459 
R-squared 0.474 0.336 0.297 0.455 0.317 0.292 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
      
 
6. Variation across sectors and countries 
While the shift-share analysis discussed earlier provided evidence that the pattern of decline identified 
in aggregate labour shares appear to be driven mainly by developments within sectors rather than 
reallocation across sectors, it is still possible that there may be variation in how the strength of the 
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factors identified in the previous section operate across groups of sectors or across countries. This 
section therefore splits the sample into a number of subgroups to see if we can find any systematic 
differences across the groups in how concentration and productivity dispersion are affecting the 
labour share of value added. We begin by using a very broad split of sectors into basic (mainly primary 
production), manufacturing and services. We then look in more depth at manufacturing and services 
by splitting them into technology and knowledge classes based on Eurostat indicators. Finally, we 
examine variation across the countries in the sample. 
Table 7 initially splits the sectors into three broad groups and runs the baseline specification 
containing sector concentration and productivity dispersion on total labour share as well as on the 
within and between components. Sector concentration is statistically significantly associated with 
overall labour share for each of the broad groups with the coefficient size being remarkably similar for 
both manufacturing and services but somewhat lower for basic production sectors. Looking within the 
components sees a reasonably even split in the contributions of within and between components for 
basic sectors, with neither being statistically significant; athis may be related to the relatively small 
number of observations for this group. For both manufacturing and services, we find that the majority 
of the overall effect is accounted for by the between firm margin. In services, this accounts for almost 
all of the overall effect while in manufacturing about three-quarters of the total effect comes from 
the between measure.  
When we look at productivity dispersion, the variation in the size of the effects across the sector 
groups is more substantial but the broad pattern identified in the baseline specification of a negative 
relationship coming mainly through the between firm reallocation margin mainly holds. Basic 
production sectors and manufacturing both have similar overall estimates of the negative relationship 
between the labour share and productivity dispersion. The components are quite different, however, 
with most of the relationship in basic sectors coming from changes in the within firm labour share, 
whereas in manufacturing the within firm margin accounts for only around one-third of the total 
coefficient with the reminder related to between firm reallocation. The magnitude of the relationship 
between labour share and productivity dispersion is quite a bit lower for services – potentially related 
to their greater labour intensity – but the split into within and between components of approximately 









Table 7: Variation across Broad Sector Groups 
  Concentration (HHI) Productivity dispersion Obs 
Basic Total -0.187** (0.074) -0.996*** (0.213) 454 
Basic Within -0.142 (0.100) -0.488 (0.368) 454 
Basic Between -0.044 (0.095) -0.508** (0.247) 454 
Manufacturing Total -0.588*** (0.076) -0.110* (0.058) 1,964 
Manufacturing Within -0.286*** (0.054) -0.046 (0.032) 1,964 
Manufacturing Between -0.302*** (0.090) -0.064** (0.028) 1,964 
Services Total -0.375*** (0.082) -0.365** (0.147) 2,355 
Services Within -0.032 (0.050) -0.127* (0.069) 2,355 
Services Between -0.342*** (0.088) -0.238*** (0.089) 2,355 
Reports separate regressions for each group. Controlling for country, 2-digit sector and year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We next look more deeply into the broad manufacturing and services divisions by further splitting the 
two according to Eurostat classifications of technology level (Eurostat 2016). Manufacturing sectors 
are divided into four groups: high technology, medium-high, medium-low and low technology. Table 
8 shows a strong negative association between concentration and labour shares in the high-
technology group, coming predominantly from the reallocation margin. Productivity dispersion, on 
the other hand, is not found to have any statistically significant effect for this subgroup. For the two 
medium technology subgroups we find the opposite pattern from that of the highest technology group 
with the main statistically significant relationship found to be between productivity dispersion and 
labour shares. In both cases the effect comes primarily from the between margin so reallocation 
across firms plays a strong role. There is some effect operating through the within firm margin in the 
medium-high technology group but this is not observed in the medium-low group where only the 
between margin is significant. For the low technology sectors, we again see concentration as a 
significant driver along with productivity dispersion. These results suggest that the hypothesis of 
increased importance of superstar firms dominating production is not limited (or even strongest) in 





Table 8: Variation across Technology Class in Manufacturing 
  Concentration (HHI) Productivity dispersion Obs. 
High Total -0.742*** (0.248) -0.022 (0.018) 181 
High Within -0.330 (0.239) -0.013 (0.019) 181 
High Between -0.412* (0.241) -0.009 (0.013) 181 
Med-high Total 0.023 (0.103) -1.025*** (0.244) 487 
Med-high Within -0.177 (0.109) -0.375*** (0.088) 487 
Med-high Between 0.200 (0.169) -0.650*** (0.224) 487 
Med-low Total -1.340 (0.948) -2.256** (0.939) 590 
Med-low Within 0.159 (0.201) 0.101 (0.339) 590 
Med-low Between -1.499 (1.002) -2.357** (0.921) 590 
Low Total -0.680*** (0.164) -1.463*** (0.455) 684 
Low Within -0.340*** (0.101) -0.824*** (0.292) 684 
Low Between -0.340** (0.147) -0.639 (0.408) 684 
Reports separate regressions for each group. Controlling for country, 2-digit sector and year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We make a similar division of services sectors into knowledge intensive sectors and less knowledge 
intensive sectors as categorised by Eurostat (2016). As with manufacturing we find in Table 9 that 
overall lower labour shares are associated with greater productivity dispersion in both groups 
although the magnitude of the effect is considerably larger for the less knowledge intensive sectors. 
Likewise, in both groups, the majority of the productivity effect operates through the between margin. 
Concentration is associated with lower labour shares particularly in knowledge intensive sectors, 
although decomposing the balance of the components is not statistically significant. For both 
manufacturing and services, we therefore find that the strongest link between greater concentration 
and lower labour shares is in the higher technology sectors but that the effect of productivity 




Table 9: Variation across Knowledge Class in Services 
  Concentration (HHI) Productivity dispersion Obs. 
Knowledge intensive Total -0.409*** (0.131) -0.188*** (0.073) 804 
Knowledge intensive Within -0.116 (0.124) -0.062 (0.053) 804 
Knowledge intensive Between -0.294 (0.182) -0.127*** (0.039) 804 
Less knowledge intensive Total 0.018 (0.104) -2.151*** (0.161) 937 
Less knowledge intensive Within -0.189* (0.113) -0.755*** (0.128) 937 
Less knowledge intensive Between 0.207 (0.177) -1.396*** (0.151) 937 
Reports separate regressions for each group. Controlling for country, 2-digit sector and year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Our final split of the data is to look across countries in Table 10. Although not all individual country 
specifications show statistically significant results, the broad pattern of coefficients is in line with our 
pooled estimations. In seven of the fifteen countries, concentration is statistically significantly 
associated with lower labour shares and in eleven of the fifteen, productivity dispersion is significantly 
negatively related to the labour share. One striking exception to the pattern is a strong positive 
relationship between concentration and labour share in France – a possible explanation for this could 
be if worker bargaining power or unionisation levels are high in more concentrated sectors but we do 
not have enough data at a sector level to investigate if this is the case. It is a useful demonstration 
however that sector concentration does not necessarily have to reduce the worker share of value-









Table 10: Variation across Countries 
 Concentration (HHI)  Productivity dispersion 
 
Total Within Between 
 
Total Within Between 
Belgium -0.254** -0.061 -0.193  -0.056*** 0.023 -0.079*** 
Croatia -0.151 -0.098 -0.053  -1.800*** -1.297* -0.503 
Czech R. -7.659*** -2.213 -5.446*  -0.120** -0.082 -0.037 
Denmark 0.636* -0.047 0.683*  -0.137 -0.124 -0.013 
Finland -0.667 -0.845 0.178  -1.144*** 0.162 -1.306*** 
France 10.082*** -3.969 14.051***  -0.228 0.288 -0.517 
Hungary -2.504*** -0.184 -2.320***  -9.954*** -0.386 -9.568** 
Ireland -0.108 -0.263** 0.155  -0.008 0.025*** -0.033*** 
Italy -7.140*** -1.889 -5.251**  -4.891*** -1.524 -3.367** 
Lithuania -0.947** 2.022*** -2.969***  -0.405 -3.333*** 2.929 
Netherlands -1.729** -1.124 -0.605  -1.389*** -0.149 -1.240** 
Portugal -0.153 0.615 -0.768  -6.534*** -0.021 -6.513*** 
Slovenia -0.812 0.398 -1.210  -0.588** -0.562 -0.026 
Spain -0.536** 0.788 -1.324*  -4.285*** -1.922** -2.363 
Sweden -0.568 -1.075*** 0.506  -2.787*** -1.442*** -1.345 
Reports separate regressions for each country. Controlling for 2-digit sector and year fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Conclusions 
This paper uses aggregated microdata from across Europe to analyse the factors most associated with 
changes in the labour share of income and to decompose the extent to which these have operated 
through average firm-level changes within sectors or through a reallocation of resources between 
firms in a sector towards large firms characterised by lower labour shares.  
The labour share of national income has been steadily declining in countries across the world for many 
years with the causes still under debate. This paper first demonstrates that this decline across 
countries has been driven by changes within industries by constructing a shift-share analysis with a 
counterfactual labour share based on unchanged sector composition. This approach shows that very 
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little of the overall decline is associated with structural change across sectors and we must therefore 
look within sectors to identify the key drivers.  
While some work has been done on more disaggregated data (Autor et al, 2017; Mertens, 2019), these 
have been restricted to individual countries. The benefit of the use of the CompNet aggregated 
microdata data is that we can look at development across countries while also having distributional 
details that would rarely be present in standard sectoral data. This allows us to investigate how 
concentration and productivity dispersion in particular are affecting the labour share. Furthermore, 
this data allows us to decompose the effects into those operating on the average labour share within 
a sector and those reallocating resources between firms, a key factor to investigating the strength of 
the “superstar firms” hypothesis which has become the focal point of recent research in this area.  
Across a wide range of countries and sectoral groups, we find consistent evidence that the decline in 
the labour share across Europe is significantly associated with greater concentration and dispersion 
of productivity within sectors. In addition, these effects mainly operate through the channel of 
reallocation between firms, thus providing support for the superstar firm hypothesis. Other factors 
that appear important are involvement in global value chains, investment prices and mark-ups. 
It is clear that the labour share is not the fixed parameter assumed in many early macro-economic 
models. This matters from a policy perspective because wages are the main form of income for 
households so a fall in the labour share suggests gains made from productivity or globalisation are not 
being passed on to workers. Trends in the labour share can also have a distributional impact, 
potentially exacerbating inequality. For these reasons, a declining labour share can also have political 
consequences if it erodes support for market-oriented economic policies, or for globalisation more 
broadly. To effectively counterbalance this requires an understanding of the drivers of the decline in 
the labour share in the first instance. This paper provides the first cross-country evidence on how the 
labour share decline is associated with trends in productivity dispersion and increased firm 
concentration and globalisation, all of which all of which point to fruitful avenues of further research 
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Appendix 1: Irish Labour Share and GDP Measurement Issues 
 
According to standard aggregates, the share of national income going to wages in Ireland has fallen 
consistently in recent decades and European Commission data show that the wage bill expressed as a 
fraction of GDP in Ireland is the lowest in the European Union. 
 
However, the decline in the labour income share of value added is clearly overstated by the significant 
growth of the multinational sector since the 1980’s and, more recently, by distortions arising in parts 
of the multinational sector which artificially inflate (non-labour) activity in Ireland, most notably with 
the exceptional growth rate recorded in 2015.  
 
Department of Finance (2018) showed that using modified GNI as the numerator, which excludes 
much of the statistical distortions arising from globalisation, enables a more meaningful analysis of 
trends in the labour income share over time. Figure A1 below shows the labour share of time with 
GDP, GNI and GNI* as the numerators. All demonstrate a negative trend over time, in line with the 
global decline. The GNI* measure has a much higher level however, and does not display the level 
shift in 2015. In fact, the GNI* based labour share is much more in line with the EU average, as 
illustrated in Figure A2. 
 
 
Figure A1: Irelands labour share in GDP, GNI and GNI* terms 
 
Source: CSO, Department of Finance 

















Figure A2: Irelands GNI* - based labour share vs. EU labour share 
 
Source: Department of Finance, CSO, AMECO 
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